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The Euro at Five: Ready for a Global Role?
The euro stands on the brink of becoming one of the world’s two reserve currencies. Is it ready to fulﬁll 
its emerging global role? The overall verdict on the great European monetary experiment is mixed. The 
Euro at Five: Ready for a Global Role?, edited by Senior Fellow Adam S. Posen, establishes that on the one 
hand the euro has delivered monetary stability to the eurozone, brought down interest rates and 
inﬂation expectations, and expanded European bond markets enormously. On the other hand, 
the introduction of the euro has failed to improve the performance of the major eurozone 
economies or to deeply integrate European ﬁnancial markets. 
If overall growth in Europe continues to lag, investors will remain reluctant to switch into euro-
denominated assets. This reluctance could leave a vacuum of international monetary leadership when 
the dollar declines. Such a vacuum would drag out the global adjustment process and add to ﬁnancial 
uncertainty.
  What accounts for this disappointing shortfall in the euro’s impact? Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) was widely expected to transform (1) eurozone ﬁnancial markets and (2) euro member 
countries’ ﬁscal policy. Yet the policy reforms needed to ensure the overall success of EMU and its 
members’ economies have not followed the euro’s creation.
The contributors to The Euro at Five conclude that failures to break down national barriers within 
Europe hinder ﬁnancial-market integration in the eurozone. Factors in the nonﬁnancial economy—such 
as legal differences, obstacles to more rapid real growth, transactions costs, and institutional gaps in 
ﬁnancial supervision—combine to keep the eurozone from building ﬁnancial markets that could rival 
those in New York or London. Other major constraints on the euro’s rise to international prominence 
have been the underperformance of the major eurozone economies, their resulting resort to deﬁcit 
spending, and the fragmentation of eurozone representation in the international arena. 
  The failure of the euro to induce signiﬁcant structural reform and growth in Europe necessitates 
an active policy agenda. The Euro at Five advocates the following measures:
Remove obstacles to ﬁnancial integration in Europe. Legal differences among member 
countries, regulations promoting risk aversion, and high transactions costs for ﬁnancial services block 
the eurozone from achieving deep and integrated ﬁnancial markets. The euro’s launch has directly 
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In Briefintegrated only overnight and money markets. Even repo markets remain nationally fragmented. The 
European Union must push ahead with its Financial Services Action Plan and, even more important, with 
the integration of a single European market in services.
  Strengthen the crisis response capabilities of the euro area. Primary responsibility for 
banking supervision has remained at the national level, with supervisors further split by the type of 
ﬁnancial institution covered. There is thus a strong risk that national supervisors will protect weak ﬁnancial 
institutions. It is unclear whether the European Central Bank (ECB) has the legal capacity to act as lender of 
last resort, and this ambiguity must be removed.
  Deliver greater macroeconomic stabilization rather than make futile efforts to enforce the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The transfer of monetary sovereignty to the ECB increased output volatility in 
some member nations. The major eurozone economies’ unwillingness to adhere to the pact is thus a rational 
policy response to recession. Violators of the pact are also the most likely to beneﬁt from the use of ﬁscal 
policy and the least likely to experience virtuous cycles whereby budget cutbacks produce growth and 
investment inﬂows. Thus ﬁscal discipline will remain a dead letter for the major eurozone countries until the 
ECB does more to stabilize their business cycles.
  Consolidate eurozone representation in the G-7 and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The euro’s impending global role makes urgent the need to end Europe’s fragmented 
overrepresentation in the international ﬁnancial institutions. The euro area should rationalize its 
representation in bodies such as the IMF and speak with one voice. Such consolidation of the European 
voice at the Fund should also be encouraged because it would allow the eurozone to play a constructive role 
in increasing the representation of China and Asia more broadly. 
To buy this book, go to http://bookstore.iie.com/merchant.mvc?Screen=PROD&Product_Code=384.
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